The board of directors has the decision-making and supervision authority over the executive compensation covenants, and the characteristics of its team will also affect the structure and effectiveness of the executive compensation contract. Taking a sample of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2019 in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stocks, this paper investigates the impact of directors board fracture zone on executive compensation stickiness. It turns out that the board fracture zone aggravates stickiness, in which internal control quality exerts a partially mediating role. In addition, compared with the shallow fracture zone, the deeper one has a more significant effect on the executive compensation stickiness. In contrast to the "rewarding the best and punishing the worst" pattern, the board fracture zone has a greater influence on the "rewarding both the best and the worst" in executive compensation stickiness. Considering the influence of governance environment, the effect of board fracture zone on the stickiness of executive compensation is more significant in state-owned enterprises and firms with weak product market competition. The research results provide a theoretical reference for the reform of the compensation system and the improvement of the governance efficiency of directors board for China's listed companies.